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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RAE ADAMSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Docket No. 89068Q-DA

-vsRANAE ADAMSON,

Priority Classification 14b

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, Ranae Adamson, hereby submits the
following Responding Brief in the above-captioned matter:
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as
amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order entered
by the trial court herein on or about August 28, 1989 in a
domestic proceeding.

No motions pursuant to Rules 50(a), 50(b),

52(b) or 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were filed in this
matter.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 13, 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether the lower court abused its discretion by
denying husband's motion to terminate his alimony obligation.
(2) Whether the lower court abused its discretion by
finding no substantial change in circumstances to modify the
issue of alimony.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
There are no case law authorities or statutory authorities
believed by Respondent to be wholly dispositive of the issues on
appeal herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not dispute the facts stated in Appellant's
Statement of the Facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Appellant produced insufficient evidence to sustain a

finding that Mrs. Adamson and Mr. McCray shared a common
permanent residency and that they engaged in sexual contact
evidencing a conjugal association.
2.

Appellant produced insufficient evidence to sustain a

finding of substantial change of circumstances.
3.

Alimony should not terminate based on the equitable

circumstances of the parties.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT 1: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF CONSIDERATION.
Both Utah law and the parties' Decree of Divorce state that
alimony terminates upon a finding that the receiving party is
cohabiting.

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3), and paragraph 11, Decree

of Divorce.

The standard of review for a finding of cohabitation

is that of abuse of discretion.
409, 410 (Utah 1977).

English v. English, 565 P.2d

The controlling case for this issue is

Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985).

In Haddow, the court

held that a finding of cohabitation should be based on the two
elements of a common residency and sexual contact evidencing a
conjugal association.

The Haddow court also held that the

element of shared living expenses, while not a requisite element
of cohabitation, is helpful in determining cohabitation.
Appellant failed to establish common residency, conjugal
sexual contact or even shared living expenses sufficient to
support a finding of cohabitation.
a. Respondent and Mr. McCray did not share a principal
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of
time.
The Haddow court defined common residency as the sharing of
a common abode that both parties consider their principal
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time.
P.2d at 672.

707

In the present case, Appellant's evidence regarding

any alleged cohabitation was sketchy at best and did not rise to

3

the level of cohabitation.

Appellant produced evidence to show

that Respondent lived in a motel room previously rented by Mr.
McCray, that he had helped her with the rent from time to time
and that he spent a "great deal of time" there.

(T. 98-100).

Mrs. Adamson, produced testimony that Mr. McCray's
contribution to the rent consisted of his having painted part of
the exterior of the motel in which Mrs. Adamson resided in
exchange for an offset on her motel bill. Appellant's witness
admitted that she had not seen Mr. McCray carry personal
belongings in or out of the room.

(T. 100-101).

Mrs. Adamson

testified that she and Mr. McCray were "just very good friends."
(T. 113). She also testified that Mr. McCray helped her obtain
the motel room because it was too cold to sleep outside and
because she needed a place to receive her children for
visitation.

(T. 38, 114). She testified that Mr. McCray painted

part of the exterior of the motel in exchange for a $600.00
offset for three months of her rent and that Mr. McCray's
permanent residence was in Draper.

(T. 114). The record

suggests that Mr. McCray's contribution in the form of painting
services would probably not be long term because he had a stroke
while painting.

(T. 118).

Mr. McCray testified that he lived in Draper with his mother
and stepfather and that the Draper residence was his permanent
home.

(T. 133). He testified that even though he never finished

the painting job, Mrs. Adamson still received a partial offset on
her rent for a few months. (T. 134).
4

There was no evidence as to whether Mr. McCray had a key to
the motel, whether he spent time there when Mrs. Adamson was not
there, whether he could come and go as he pleased, whether he
received mail there, whether he ever spent the night, or whether
he was registered to vote in that district.

In short, there was

no evidence to show that the motel room was also Mr. McCrayfs
permanent residence.

Therefore, Appellant's argument that the

lower court abused its discretion in failing to find cohabitation
is unfounded.

Therefore, this Court should sustain the lower

court's ruling.
b. Appellant presented no evidence to establish that
Respondent engaged in a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between
husband and wife.
The Haddow court held that a second element of cohabitation
requires the receiving party to be in a sexual relationship
evidencing a conjugal association.

707 P.2d at 672.

Appellant presented testimony that Mr. McCray was
Respondent's "boyfriend" and that he spent a good deal of time
with her.

(T. 98-100).

Mrs. Adamson.

Mr. McCray testified that he had dated

(T. 134). Respondent testified that she and Mr.

McCray were just good friends. However there was no evidence
establishing that the two of them had any kind of sexual
relationship, not to mention "a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and
wife."

707 P.2d at 672.
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Appellant never showed whether Mrs. Adamson and Mr, McCray
had a sexual relationship, and if so, whether their relationship
was sustained over a period of time so as to be conjugal in
nature•
Based on the evidence produced, the lower court had
insufficient evidence to make a finding of cohabitation.
Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion when it did
not find cohabitation.

Therefore this Court should uphold the

lower court's ruling regarding alimony.
POINT 2. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Appellant argues that he should not be required to show a
substantial change in circumstances to modify alimony because the
decree stated that the award of alimony was subject to review.
Appellant's argument reads more into the Decree than the
lower court intended.

In the same paragraph of the Decree quoted

by Appellant, the court ordered that alimony continue "until
defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs,
or until further order of this Court." (Decree of Divorce,
paragraph 11).

The record indicates that the court anticipated

that Mrs. Adamson would find employment between the time of the
trial and the time of the review hearing.

In fact, the court

appeared at times to pressure and even to badger Mrs. Adamson
into a concerted job search:

"The Court expects the Defendant to

pursue all job training opportunities, that you contact Job
Service, that you go through any counseling that they have there,
6

that you contact the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation,
that you contact Social services."
to Vocational Rehabilitation.
Services."

(T. 82-83).

(T. 82). "I expect you to go

I expect you to go to Social

"I would expect that you make, at

minimum and more, contact for employment as required by the
Department of Employment Security. . . . Even if it's Wendy's or
wherever it is, you frequently and commonly see Part-time Jobs or
Help Needed."

(T. 83). "I expect that you make some contact

every week and that you be prepared to come back in six months
with a complete diary of every contact, the date and what
position you've applied to.

I expect you to call Job Service and

any other private employment agencies around."

(T. 84).

The court may have anticipated that a substantial change in
circumstances should or would occur between the date of the trial
and the date of the review hearing.

Nevertheless, anticipating a

change in circumstances is different than waiving the need to
show such a change.

Nothing in the record supports Appellant's

claim that the court made such a waiver.

Absent an explicit

waiver, this Court cannot assume that such an important
substantive and procedural requirement was waived.
Even if Mrs. Adamson had found employment between the time
of the divorce and the review hearing, that fact alone would not
suffice to automatically terminate alimony absent a finding of
change in circumstances.

This Court found that it was

"inappropriate to have alimony automatically terminate upon
completion of education or attainment of full time employment.
7

Rather, the matter should be returned to the trial court to look
at alimony in light of the completed education or full time
employment as they apply to the English factors. Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), see also
Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. Mar. 8,
1989).
Furthermore, the lower court did not have the discretion to
terminate alimony after a long term marriage absent a finding
that the receiving party would be able to support herself at a
standard of living to which she was accustomed during the
parties' marriage, or that the payor was no longer able to pay.
Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) see
also Johnson v. Johnson, 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, (Utah Ct. App.
March 8, 1989) .
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by
requiring Appellant to show a change in circumstances, nor did
the court abuse its discretion by refusing to terminate alimony.
Therefore, this Court should sustain the lower court's ruling
regarding alimony.
POINT 3. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT AN
AWARD OF ALIMONY.
Appellant is not appealing the original award of alimony.
Rather, Appellant is appealing the lower court's refusal to
terminate alimony at a post divorce review hearing.

Accordingly,

Respondent's position is that this Court should not reach the
issue of equitable considerations supporting alimony because

8

there was no showing of substantial and material change in
circumstances since the time of the entry of the decree.
However, the following argument is made in the event this
Court does reach the issue of equitable considerations.
Appellant, by his own testimony makes $26,067.00 a year.
(T. 103).

Mrs. Adamson's income is limited to her alimony

payments and monthly state assistance consisting of $224.00 for
housing assistance, $90.00 worth of food stamps and Medicaid
assistance.

(T. 127).

One major purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving
spouse from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565
P.2d at 411.

Terminating Respondent's alimony would render her

totally dependent on the state.
Appellant cites the fact that he has to pay a second
mortgage on the house as a hardship factor for not paying
alimony.

However, that second mortgage was taken out either

shortly before or after the separation.

(T. 41 and 61).

The

$14,000.00 he received from the mortgage was used to pay for his
truck and to pay off his student loan bills.

(T. 61). He

received value for both those debts because he currently has a
masters degree and a social work license and he was awarded the
truck in the divorce.

(T. 62).

On the other hand, Mrs. Adamson received no benefit from the
$14,000.00 loan on the house.

Nevertheless, Appellant is asking

her to forego alimony because he chose to borrow money to cover
his own personal expenses.
9

Even though Appellant may have overextended himself
financially, Mrs. Adamson should not be penalized for his poor
financial planning.

This Court has made clear that alimony need

not come from the income of the payor and that alimony could be
paid out of inherited or gifted property or from marital
property.

Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App.

1988), Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 302, 308 (Utah 1988),
Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Likewise, the lower court in this case did not abuse its
discretion in setting alimony in the present case where the
husband had a professional license, was well educated and had a
work history demonstrating his ability to provide despite the
fact that he may have been underemployed at the time of the
trial.
In short, it is equitable to require Appellant to honor his
alimony obligation from whatsaver funds he has.

To do otherwise

would be to penalize Mrs. Adamson for the fact that Appellant
took out an excessive personcil loan.
Mrs. Adamson was in a long term marriage with Appellant in
that she was married for 17 years.

(T. 109). After the first

year of marriage, she was not employed outside the home.
109).

(T. 20,

She should be compensated for foregoing any personal and

professional advancements and for devoting her productive years
to raising their children as well as his child from a former
marriage.

Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74-75 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1988), Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (T. 28-30).
In addition, Mrs. Adamson's special needs must be examined
when determining alimony.

In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369,

1371-72 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court held that it is
appropriate for the trial court to take into account whether
physical or mental disabilities arising during the marriage,
regardless of their cause, have made the receiving party's needs
greater.
Mrs. Adamson's health problems include severe abdominal
pain, a duodenal ulcer, high blood pressure, severe depression, a
urologic infection and foot problems.

(T. 34-35 and 46).

These

problems are compounded by the fact that she is a middle-aged
female and, except for a brief period, has been out of the labor
market for over 17 years.

It is unrealistic to expect her to

achieve the marital standard of living.

In a case similar to

this one, this Court has held that it would be an abuse of
discretion to terminate alimony for a woman in her mid-50s who
possessed few marketable job skills and had little hope of
retraining.
1988).

Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App.

See also Hialey v. Hialey, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983).

Another equitable factor used in long term marriages is the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.

"The ultimate

test of the propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all
these factors, the party receiving alimony will be able to
support him- or.herself at the standard of living enjoyed during
11

the marriage*"

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App.

1988), Schindler v. Schindler, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct.
App. June 6, 1989).
In short, even were this Court to reach the equitable
considerations, such considerations would include the length of
marriage, Mrs. Adamson's health problems, her lack of job
training, Mr. Adamson's education, training, professional license
and ability to earn.

These considerations would support a

generous award of alimony to Mrs. Adamson.

Therefore, this Court

should sustain the lower court's refusal to terminate alimony.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision should
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS Jj__ DAY OF April, 1990.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

MARTHA PtflUCE
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Utah
Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for Defendant/Respondent herein,
and that I caused the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be served
upon Defendant by hand-delivering four true and correct copies of
the same to:

on the

4
y

MARY C. CORPORON
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 11 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
day of April, 1990.
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

(Decree of divorce, copy from Appellant's brief.)

RLTO DISTRICT COtWT

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 0 1989
» S A _ L , W K E COUNTY

MCjj

By.

0«putyCi#m

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE"OF UTAH.
RAE ADAMSON,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

-vs-

Civil No. D87-4654

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February,
1989,

the

Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup,

Judge

presiding;

the

plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C.
Corporon,

and

the defendant

appearing

in person

and by and

through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the
sworn

testimony

of the parties

and their witnesses

and the

arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being
fully advised

in the premises and more than 90 days having

elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

granted

a

Decree

of Divorce,

dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon
being

signed

by the

Judge and entered

by the clerk in the

register of actions.
2.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and
Tracy•
3.

Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly with the

minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking
into

consideration

visitation

the

Court's

recommendation

occur either on a Saturday

or on

that

a Sunday,

this
In

addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on
the children's birthday, as she may arrange between herself and
the children.
liberal

Further, defendant

telephone

access

with

is awarded
the

minor

reasonable and
children.

The

defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised;
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit
with the defendant on that occasion.
4.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and accident

insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the
parties, as it is available to him through his employment.
5.

Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children,

are hereby ordered to submit to counseling with a qualified
2

family therapist/ either through Salt Lake County Mental Health/
the

Utah

State

Department

of

Social

Services,

or

another

qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the
conflict between the defendant and the minor children of the
parties.
6.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of

any interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the
Ford Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and

obligations incurred by the parties until the date of the divorce
herein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant
for her living accommodations,
8.

The

parties'

previous

division

of

their

items

of

personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household
furnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each
and each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own
possession, with the exception of the following items, which are
hereby awarded to the defendant:

the grandfather clock/ one set

of bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of
the tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual
table and chairs.
9.

Plaintiff

is hereby awarded

the permanent

use and

possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195
South 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right,
title and interest therein, including the right to any reserve
account, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject
to the first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon,
which plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold
3

defendant

harmless

thereon*

Defendant

is hereby ordered to

execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may
i$r AJU*^^I£&L
?/#, coo
££*.
have in said real property to the plaintiffJ

Further, defendant

is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)#
representing
property,

her

one-half

payable

upon

share

the

of

first

the

equity

to occur of

in

the real

the

following

events:
a.

plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home

with woman other than the defendant;
b.
of

18 years

the youngest child of the parties attaining the age
or

graduating

from

high

school

in due course,

whichever last occurs;
c.
d«

the death of the plaintiff;
the

sale of

the real property

at plaintiff's

election;
e.

plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as

his primary place of residence.
10.

Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with

the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties,
according

to the Woodward

formula, and

a Qualified

Domestic

Relations Order shall issue from this Court.
11.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum

of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony,
commencing with the month of February 1989, and continuing until
the

death

of

the

plaintiff

or

defendant,

remarriage or cohabitation, whichever
further order of this Court.

until

defendant's

first occurs, or until

This award of alimony is subject to
4

review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the
assigned judge.
12.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment

opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her
as set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court.
Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of
three

applications

for employment

per week with

prospective

employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this
Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989.
13.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum

of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from
high school in the normal course of their high school educations#
whichever event occurs later.

In any month when the defendant

fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child
support," said child support shall be deducted from defendant's
lien on the marital residence of the parties.
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. sea, (Supp. 1988).
14.

Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own

court costs and attorney's fees.
15.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
5

property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
DATED THIS

. 1989.

2A~clay of _
BY THE COURT

T
KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY

that

I am employed

in the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that
I caused the foregoing proposed Decree of Divorce

to be served

upon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in
an envelope addressed to:
JEFFREY C. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant
225 South 200 East
Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
on the

iA-y- day of February, 1989 •

Secretary

